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Power Shift: The Return of the Uniting for
Peace Resolution
Michael P. Scharf1
Abstract
In 2022, the United States dusted off the 1950 Uniting for Peace
Resolution in order to obtain General Assembly condemnation of
the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This was the first time in three
decades that the Security Council and General Assembly had
utilized the Uniting for Peace mechanism – a process designed to
end-run a Security Council veto. Together with the General
Assembly’s creation of the international investigative mechanism
for Syria in 2016 over Russia’s objection, the use of the Uniting for
Peace process to condemn Russia’s aggression represented a shift
in power away from the Security Council and to the General
Assembly, with potentially broad and long-term implications. This
article examines the causes and consequences of that power shift.
Contents
I. Introduction
II. The History of the Uniting for Peace Resolution
A. Security Council Deadlock During the Cold War
B. The Creation and Uses of the Uniting for Peace
Resolution
III. Is the Uniting for Peace Resolution Still Relevant Today?
Michael P. Scharf is Co-Dean of the Law School and the Joseph C. Hostetler—
BakerHostetler Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University. He is
also President of the American Branch of the International Law Association and
Co-Founder of the Public International Law & Policy Group, a Nobel Peace
Prize-nominated NGO. During the elder Bush and Clinton Administrations,
Scharf served as Attorney Adviser for U.N. Affairs at the U.S. Department of
State.
1

1

CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL. 55 (FORTHCOMING 2023)
Power Shift: The Return of the Uniting for Peace Resolution

A. The General Assembly’s Creation of the IIIM
B. Humanitarian Intervention: The Bombing of the Syrian
Chemical Weapons Facilities
C. Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: Reemergence of the
Uniting for Peace Resolution
IV. Conclusion
I. Introduction
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, foreign
policy experts optimistically declared that the world had entered the
“post-cold war age.”2 Within the U.N. Security Council, it was a
period of unprecedented collaboration and accomplishment.3 In the
few years that followed, the U.N. Security Council adopted more
Chapter VII resolutions (condemning international law violations,
establishing peace-keeping forces, imposing sanctions, authorizing
force, establishing No Fly Zones and Safe Areas, and creating
investigative commissions and international criminal tribunals) than
in the preceding five decades since the creation of the United
Nations.4 But with the onset of the Syrian conflict, and rising
tensions between China and the United States, by 2012 that began
to change.5
During the Syrian conflict, Russia vetoed thirteen Security
Council Resolutions that would have condemned the Syrian
government’s atrocities, created a commission to investigate Syria’s
2

Charles William Maynes and William G. Hayland, THE NATURE OF THE
POST-COLD WAR WORLD (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 1993) (Maynes was the editor of Foreign Policy and Hayland was the
editor of Foreign Affairs), available at:
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1993/ssi_mayneshyland.pdf
3
See generally KENNETH MANUSAMA, THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY
(2006).
4
Id.
5
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, MILENA STERIO, AND PAUL R. WILLIAMS, THE SYRIA
CONFLICT’S IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2020).
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use of chemical weapons, and referred the matter to the International
Criminal Court. 6 In this context, the Guardian newspaper reported
in 2015 that “[t]he United States has warned that Russia’s continued
blanket use of its UN veto will jeopardize the [S]ecurity [C]ouncil’s
long-term legitimacy and could lead the U.S. and like-minded
countries to bypass it as a decision-making body.”7 As the U.S.
Permanent Representative to the U.N. told the Guardian: “It’s a
Darwinian universe here. If a particular body reveals itself to be
dysfunctional, then people are going to go elsewhere.”8 That threat
became reality in December 2016 when the General Assembly,
acting unilaterally, created the International Impartial and
Independent Investigative Mechanism (IIIM) to document Syrian
atrocities and prepare case files for prosecution.9
Then in February 2022, Russia’s massive invasion of
neighboring Ukraine ushered in a full-on return of the Cold War.10
The invasion and international response were described as “a major
breaking point in history.”11 Five days after the invasion, 11
6

MICHAEL P. SCHARF, MILENA STERIO, AND PAUL R. WILLIAMS, THE SYRIA
CONFLICT’S IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2020).
7
Julian Borger and Bastien Inzaurralde, Russian Vetoes are Putting UN Security
Council Legitimacy at Risk, US Says, THE GUARDIAN, September 23, 2015.
8
Id.
9
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, MILENA STERIO, AND PAUL R. WILLIAMS, THE SYRIA
CONFLICT’S IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 59-109 (2020)
10
Elliott Abrams, The New Cold War, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, March 3,
2022, available at: https://www.cfr.org/blog/new‐cold‐war‐0 (Abrams served
as President George W. Bush’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Global
Democracy Strategy); John Simpson, Ukraine invasion: Is this a new Cold War,
BBC NEWS, February 24, 2022 (Simpson is the World Affairs Editor of the BBC),
available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world‐europe‐60515342; Travis
Andersen, Does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine signal the start of a new Cold War?
THE BOSTON GLOBE, March 2, 2022, available at: https://www.msn.com/en‐
us/news/world/does‐russias‐invasion‐of‐ukraine‐signal‐the‐start‐of‐a‐new‐
cold‐war‐foreign‐policy‐specialists‐weigh‐in/ar‐AAUwzIQ.
11
Dan De Luce, A new Cold War without rules: U.S. braces for a long‐term
confrontation with Russia, NBC NEWS, March 6, 2022 (quoting Mary Elise
Sarotte, professor of history at the Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies), available at:
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members of the UN Security Council, adopted a U.S.-drafted
Resolution invoking the authority of the 1950 “Uniting for Peace”
Resolution12 and calling for a special session of the UN General
Assembly to take action to respond to Russia’s aggression in
circumvention of Russia’s veto at the Security Council.13 At that
special session, on March 2, the U.N. General Assembly adopted
Resolution ES-11/1 by a vote of 141 in favor, 5 opposed, and 35
abstentions.14 The Resolution characterized Russia’s action as
“aggression … in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter” and
demanded that Russia “immediately, completely and
unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory
of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.”15
This was the first time in three decades that the Security
Council and General Assembly had utilized the “Uniting for Peace”
procedure – a process designed to end-run a Security Council veto.
Together with the General Assembly’s creation of the IIIM in 2016,
the use of the Uniting for Peace process to condemn Russia’s
aggression in 2022 represented a shift in power away from the
Security Council and to the General Assembly, with potentially
broad and long-term implications.
This article examines the causes and consequences of that
power shift. First it surveys the history of the adoption of the Uniting
for Peace Resolution and its historic uses. Next, it explores the UN
General Assembly’s creation of the IIIM and the adoption of
Resolution ES-11/1, focusing on the reinterpretation of the U.N.
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/new‐cold‐war‐rules‐us‐
braces‐long‐term‐confrontation‐russia‐rcna18554
12
The Uniting for Peace Resolution, Resolution 377 (V) (1950), November 3,
1950.
13
UNSC Res. 2623 (2022), available at:
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un‐documents/document/s‐res‐
2623.php
14
UNGA Res. ES‐11/1 (2022), available at: https://documents‐dds‐
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N22/272/27/PDF/N2227227.pdf?OpenElement
(States opposing wereBelarus, North Korea, Eritrea, Russia and Syria).
15
Id. at Operative Paras. 2 and 4.
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Charter reflected by those developments. Finally, it analyzes the
likely legal and institutional consequences of these developments.
II. The History of the Uniting for Peace Resolution
A. Security Council Deadlock During the Cold War
After the failure of the League of Nations (1920-1945), the
countries that negotiated the UN Charter in San Francisco in MayJune 1945 formed the new organization around a potent Security
Council, made up of the five most powerful States (the Permanent
Members)16 and a handful of others elected on a rotating basis.
While the General Assembly would include every member of the
organization with an equal vote, the Security Council would have
the primary responsibility within the UN system for the maintenance
of international peace and security, as well as enforcement of
international law.17
As the price demanded for their support of the new
organization,18 the Permanent Members were accorded a veto over
all substantive matters before the Security Council.19 The delegates
at San Francisco granted the veto power to the Permanent Five
because of “a tremendous amount of confidence in the certainty that
the veto shall not be applied except in exceptional cases.”20 But that
confidence was misplaced. The creation of the United Nations

16

The Permanent Members of the Security Council are China (originally
Nationalist China and now the People’s Republic of China), France, the Soviet
Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom, and the United States.
17
U.N. Charter, arts. 41, 42, and 94.
18
Joseph M. Isanga, Resurgent Cold War and U.N. Security Council Reform
Opportunities, 47 Denver J. Int’l L. 73, 82 (2019).
19
U.N. Charter, art. 27.
20
Commission III Security Council, Verbatim Minutes of the First Meeting of
Commission III, Doc. 943 III/5 (June 13, 1945), reprinted in 11 Documents of the
United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 13
(1945), at 165 (quoting the address of Mr. Lleras Camaroo of Columbia).
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corresponded with the dawn of the Cold War.21 It was a period
marked by gridlock in the Security Council, which was prevented
by the Permanent Member veto from intervening to halt atrocities
and bloodshed in a variety of conflict areas around the world.22
During the Cold War period, the Soviet Union vetoed 122
Resolutions, the United States vetoed 80, Britain vetoed 32, France
vetoed 20, while China vetoed none.23
Security Council deadlock during the Cold War went
through two phases. In the first (1946-1965), when most of the
members of the United Nations were West-leaning States, the Soviet
Union vetoed 106 resolutions, while the United States vetoed none.
24
In the second phase (1966-1989), during which a number of
former colonies joined the United Nations as newly independent
States, the United States vetoed 67 Security Council Resolutions
(most related to Israel), while the Soviet Union vetoed just 13. 25
The frequent use of the veto, especially in cases where U.N.
action could halt humanitarian disasters, has eroded the legitimacy
of the United Nations Security Council. Over the years there have
been numerous proposals to amend the U.N. Charter to make it more
difficult for the Permanent Five to exercise their veto power.26 But

21

Coined by George Orwell in 1945, the term “Cold War” has been used to
describe the open yet restricted rivalry that developed after World War II
between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies. The
Cold War was waged from 1945 to 1991 on political, economic, and
propaganda fronts with fighting confined to conventional weapons between
proxy nations and insurgent groups. Britannica, Cold War, available at:
https://www.britannica.com/event/Cold‐War.
22
Jan Wouters and Tom Ruys, Security Council Reform: A New Veto for a New
Century, 44 MIL. L. & L WAR REV. 139, (2005).
23
Joseph M. Isanga, Resurgent Cold War and U.N. Security Council Reform
Opportunities, 47 Denver J. Int’l L. 73, 84 (2019).
24
Joseph M. Isanga, Resurgent Cold War and U.N. Security Council Reform
Opportunities, 47 Denver J. Int’l L. 73, 88 (2019).
25
Id.
26
See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Security Council’s First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT’L
L. 506 (1995); Richard Butler, Bewitched, Bothered, and Bewildered: Repairing
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Charter amendment requires the consent of the Permanent Five, so
all proposals that would weaken the veto have been met with their
opposition and have gone nowhere, leading scholars to decry that
the “veto is essentially immune from reform.”27
B. The Creation and Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution
At the height of the Cold War, the Uniting for Peace
Resolution was created to enable the General Assembly to act
quickly in an international crisis in the face of Security Council
paralysis due to a Permanent Member veto. The brainchild of the
United States, the Resolution was adopted by the General Assembly
on November 3, 1950 in response to the Soviet Union’s veto of
resolutions addressing North Korea’s aggression against South
Korea.28
In June 1950, the Security Council had initially authorized
Members of the United Nations to “furnish such assistance to the
Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack
and to restore international peace and security in the area.” 29 That
resolution was not vetoed by the Soviet Union (an ally of North
Korea) because at the time the Soviet Union was boycotting the
meetings of the Security Council in an effort to compel the Council
to seat the communist Government of Beijing rather than the
Nationalist Government of Taiwan as China. This turned out to be
an enormous diplomatic blunder since the other members of the

the Security Council, 78 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 9 (1999); John D. Caron, The Legitimacy
of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 552 (1993).
27
John D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security
Council, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 552, 569 (1993).
28
Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2008, available at:
https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ufp/ufp_e.pdf.
29
Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2008, available at:
https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ufp/ufp_e.pdf.
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Council and later the International Court of Justice30 took the
position that being absent was not the same as a non-concurring vote
for purposes of exercising the Permanent Member veto.31 When the
Soviet delegation returned to the Security Council in August 1950,
it voted against a United States draft resolution condemning the
continued defiance of the United Nations by the North Korean
authorities.32 In order to overcome this impasse, the United States
proposed that the General Assembly adopt the Uniting for Peace
Resolution.33 The United States knew that this would dilute the
power of its veto, but up to that point in time it had never used the
veto and viewed the continued authorization to fight the Korean War
as a more important consideration.
The Uniting for Peace Resolution allows the General
Assembly to immediately consider matters in which the Security
Council has failed in its duty to maintain international peace and
security due to the use of the veto. 34 It can do so when asked by a
30

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1971, p. 16, at para. 22.
31
U.N. Charter, Art. 27 (“Decisions of the Security Council on all [substantive]
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the
concurring votes of the permanent members”).
32
Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2008, available at:
https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ufp/ufp_e.pdf.
33
Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2008, available at:
https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ufp/ufp_e.pdf.
34
The Uniting for Peace Resolution, Resolution 377 (V) (1950), November 3,
1950 provides: “If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there
appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,
the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to
making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures,
including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of
armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and
security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly shall therefore
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majority of the members of the Security Council (this procedure is
not subject to the veto), or upon its own decision to take up the
matter with a two-thirds vote. If the Assembly is not in session, the
Uniting for Peace process allows it to convene an emergency
session. Then, with an affirmative vote of a two-thirds majority of
members present, the General Assembly may issue
recommendations it deems necessary in order to restore
international peace and security.
In its initial use of this authority, on February 1, 1951, the
General Assembly adopted Resolution 498(V), calling upon states
to support continued UN military action in Korea, including to repel
Chinese aggression. To date, this is the only time the General
Assembly has called for use of force under the Uniting for Peace
Resolution.35 There is scholarly debate, however, about whether the
1951 General Assembly Resolution was based on the underlying
right of collective self-defense, merely constituted a confirmation of
an existing Security Council authorization to use force, or
represented an independent authorization to take enforcement
measures.36
The Uniting for Peace Resolution was next used in 1956
when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, prompting Britain, France,
and Israel to attack Egypt with the objective to regain western
control of the Canal and remove the Egyptian President from
power.37 The U.K. and France vetoed Security Council resolutions
mandating the immediate withdrawal of armed forces. Invoking the
Uniting for Peace Resolution, the United States called for an
meet in emergency special session within twenty‐four hours of the request.
Such emergency special session may be called if requested by the Security
Council on the vote of any seven members [nine since 1965], or by a majority
of the Members of the United Nations.”
35
Michael Ramsden, Uniting for MH17, 7 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 1, 16 (2016).
36
Larry D. Johnson, Uniting for Peace: Does it Still Serve any Useful Purpose?
108 AM. J. INT’L L. 106, 112 (2014).
37
Asian Udoh, Case Study: Invoking the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution of 1950
to Authorize the Use of Humanitarian Military Interventions and Prevent Mass
Atrocities in Syria, 23 Willamette J. Int’l & Dispute Res. 187, 211 (2015).
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emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. The
Assembly convened and adopted Resolution 997, calling for an
immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of all foreign forces, an arms
embargo, the reopening of the Suez Canal, and the placement of
U.N. peacekeeping forces to monitor the situation. 38 Within a week
of the Resolution’s adoption, Britain and France withdrew their
armed forces.39
General Assembly Resolution 997 demonstrated that the
General Assembly could take up a matter that the Security Council
had been debating despite Article 12 of the U.N. Charter. That
article states that “while the Security Council is exercising in respect
of any dispute or situation the recommendations with regard to that
dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.”40 In
the 2004 Construction of a Wall Case, the International Court of
Justice confirmed that the interpretation of Article 12 has evolved
through state practice, and that there was no bar “for the General
Assembly to deal in parallel with the same matter [as the Security
Council] concerning the maintenance of international peace and
security.”41
General Assembly Resolution 997 also indicated the wide
panoply of powers that could be exercised by the General Assembly
under the Uniting for Peace Resolution which were traditionally
viewed as belonging exclusively to the Security Council.
Importantly, the Resolution did not purport to authorize force or
enforcement action. Nor has any subsequent General Assembly
Resolution invoking the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

38
Asian Udoh, Case Study: Invoking the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution of 1950
to Authorize the Use of Humanitarian Military Interventions and Prevent Mass
Atrocities in Syria, 23 Willamette J. Int’l & Dispute Res. 187, 211 (2015).
39
Asian Udoh, Case Study: Invoking the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution of 1950
to Authorize the Use of Humanitarian Military Interventions and Prevent Mass
Atrocities in Syria, 23 Willamette J. Int’l & Dispute Res. 187, 211 (2015).
40
U.N. Charter, Art. 12.
41
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 138 (July 9).
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Under the U.N. Charter, the General Assembly can only
“recommend” use of force, not “authorize” it as the Security Council
is empowered to do.42 This is significant because Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter prohibits use of force except in self-defense or when
authorized by the Security Council.43 In the “Certain Expenses”
advisory opinion of 1962, the International Court of Justice noted
that under the U.N. Charter, only the Security Council can authorize
enforcement by coercive action against an aggressor.44 This
suggests that the Uniting for Peace Resolution can only be used to
call for use of force in a situation in which the U.N. Charter would
permit collective self-defense to respond to an armed attack.45
However, some scholars argue that a General Assembly
recommendation for use of force under the Uniting for Peace
process can have the same legal affect as a Security Council
authorization because the prohibition on the use of force binds
members and not the United Nations organization.46 Thus, where
the organization delegates authority to use force through a
recommendation, such force will not run afoul of the Article 2(4)
prohibition.47
42

Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2008, available at:
https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ufp/ufp_e.pdf.
43
U.N. Charter Arts 51 (armed force in self‐defense) and 42 (armed force
authorized by the Security Council).
44
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the
Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 ICJ REP. 151, 163 (July 20).
45
U.N. Charter, Art. 51.
46
Andrew Carswell, Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace
Resolution, 18 J. Conflict & Security L. 453, 461 (2013); Ved Nanda, Challenges
to the Security Council Veto: The Security Council Veto in the Context of Atrocity
Crimes, Uniting for Peace, and the Responsibility to Protect, 51 CASE WESTERN
RES. J. INT’L L. 119, 139 (2020).
47
Andrew Carswell, Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace
Resolution, 18 J. Conflict & Security L. 453, 461 (2013); Ved Nanda, Challenges
to the Security Council Veto: The Security Council Veto in the Context of Atrocity
Crimes, Uniting for Peace, and the Responsibility to Protect, 51 CASE WESTERN
RES. J. INT’L L. 119, 139 (2020).
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Since its first use in 1951, the Uniting for Peace Resolution
has been invoked only eleven other times -- seven times at the
request of a majority of members of the Security Council and four
times unilaterally by the General Assembly. In each case, the
General Assembly recommended non-use of force measures, such
as: establishing a consensual peace keeping force (Suez Canal,
1950), establishing a commission of inquiry (Hungary 1956), calling
for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Jordan and Lebanon
(1958), calling for an embargo of weapons to the Congo (1960),
calling for the rescission by Israel of unilateral measures in
Jerusalem (1967), providing assistance to East Pakistani refugees
(1971), calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from
Afghanistan (1980), calling for the withdrawal of Israel from
territories occupied since 1967 (1980), condemning South Africa for
the occupation of Namibia and calling for assistance to the liberation
struggle (1981), calling on members to apply sanctions on Israel
(1982), and requesting an advisory opinion of the ICJ on the legal
consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied
Palestinian territory (1997).48
The Soviet Union considered the Uniting for Peace
mechanism to be an illegitimate usurpation by the General
Assembly of powers reserved to the Security Council. It therefore
refused to pay its assessed share for the peacekeeping forces
authorized by the General Assembly for the middle east (1958) and
Congo (1960). In an advisory opinion that has been described “as a
paradigm shift in the character of the UN,”49 the International Court

48
Security Council Report, Security Council Deadlocks and Uniting for Peace: An
Abridged History, October 2013, available at
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B‐6D27‐4E9C‐8CD3‐
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Security_Council_Deadlocks_and_Uniting_for_Peace.pdf;
Larry D. Johnson, Uniting for Peace: Does it Still Serve any Useful Purpose? 108
AM. J. INT’L L. 106, 112 (2014).
49
Laishram Malem Mangal, Case Commentary on Certain Expenses of the United
Nations Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, RESEARCH GATE, July 2020, available at:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342719409_Case_Commentary_Ce
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of Justice determined that the expenses for the peacekeeping forces
created by the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace
process were expenses of the organization that the Soviet Union was
obligated to pay.50 In so doing, the Court confirmed the power of the
General Assembly to authorize peacekeeping forces with the
consent of the territorial state, saying that the power of the Security
Council to take action to maintain or restore international peace and
security “is primary, not exclusive.”51 To support its opinion, the
International Court of Justice articulated a broad approach to the
implied powers doctrine, noting that “when the Organization takes
action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the
fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization.”52
III. Is the Uniting for Peace Resolution Still Relevant Today?
Until the 2022 Ukraine crisis, the Security Council had not
referred any matter under the Uniting for Peace procedure since
1982, and the General Assembly had not unilaterally invoked it
since 1997.53 Professor Christian Tomuschat believes this
reluctance reflected concern that the Uniting for Peace Resolution
“has a potential that could subvert the well-equilibrated balance of
rtain_expenses_of_the_United_Nations_Advisory_Opinion_of_20_July_1962‐
converted
50
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the
Charter), 1962 ICJ REP. 151, (July 20), available at: https://www.icj‐
cij.org/en/case/49/advisory‐opinions.
51
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the
Charter), 1962 ICJ REP. 151, (July 20), at p. 16, available at: https://www.icj‐
cij.org/en/case/49/advisory‐opinions.
52

Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the
Charter), 1962 ICJ REP. 151, 168 (July 20), available at: https://www.icj‐
cij.org/en/case/49/advisory‐opinions.
53
Ved Nanda, Challenges to the Security Council Veto: The Security Council Veto
in the Context of Atrocity Crimes, Uniting for Peace, and the Responsibility to
Protect, 51 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT’L L. 119, 141 (2020).
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power within the United Nations.”54 This concern led the Soviet
Union and later Russia to continuously object to the Resolution as
authorizing the General Assembly to act in an ultra vires manner.55
Meanwhile, after the Uniting for Peace Resolution was used in 1967,
1980, 1982, and 1997 to condemn and recommend sanctions against
Israel, the United States soured on its utility. These concerns explain
the dearth of times the Resolution has been invoked, and the length
of time that transpired since its last use and 2022.
Moreover, Larry Johnson, former Deputy Legal Counsel of
the United Nations, has argued that the Uniting for Peace Resolution
is no longer needed.56 He points out that since the General
Assembly is now in session year-round, the Uniting for Peace
Resolution is not necessary to call a special session. 57 He notes that
the International Court of Justice confirmed in the “Wall” case that
there is no bar to the General Assembly taking up a matter of which
the Security Council is seized with or without invoking the Uniting
for Peace Resolution. 58 He argues that since the General Assembly
has exercised the powers of the Uniting for Peace Resolution a
number of times without invoking the Resolution, such as in calling
for voluntary sanctions, the Resolution is not a necessary predicate
to such action.59 And with respect to the General Assembly
recommending the use of force pursuant to the Uniting for Peace
54

Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2008, available at:
https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ufp/ufp_e.pdf.
55
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to Authorize the Use of Humanitarian Military Interventions and Prevent Mass
Atrocities in Syria, 23 Willamette J. Int’l & Dispute Res. 187, 217 (2015).
56
Larry D. Johnson, Uniting for Peace: Does it Still Serve any Useful Purpose?
108 Am. J. Int’l L. 106, 112 (2014).
57
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108 Am. J. Int’l L. 106, 112 (2014).
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108 Am. J. Int’l L. 106, 112 (2014).
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resolution, Johnson argues that the Assembly can do so only within
the limited context of supporting the exercise by States of their
inherent right to individual or collective self-defense under Article
51 of the Charter.60
A. The General Assembly’s Creation of the IIIM
The Cold War began its return eight years before the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, stemming from events in Syria, a close ally of
Russia. Despite significant evidence of atrocity crimes being
committed in the ongoing civil war in Syria — particularly by
government forces — the U.N. Security Council was paralyzed by
the Russian veto, unable to take any steps towards accountability. In
May 2014, Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution that would
have referred the situation in Syria to the International Criminal
Court.61 Later, Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution that
would have established an investigative mechanism to document
Syrian use of chemical weapons and other atrocities. 62 In all, Russia
vetoed 13 resolutions to prevent accountability of the Syrian
government since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war.63
In contrast, in the 1990s the Security Council first
condemned atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, then
established an investigative commission to document them, and
finally created ad hoc tribunals to prosecute the perpetrators.64 Also,
ten years later, the Security Council referred the situations in The
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108 Am. J. Int’l L. 106, 112 (2014).
61
I. Black, Russia and China Veto UN Move to Refer Syria to International
Criminal Court, THE GUARDIAN, 22 May 2014.
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Russia’s 12 Vetoes on Syria, RTE, April 11, 2018, available at:
https://www.rte.ie/news/world/2018/0411/953637-russia-syria-un-veto/
63
Russia’s 12 Vetoes on Syria, RTE, April 11, 2018, available at:
https://www.rte.ie/news/world/2018/0411/953637-russia-syria-un-veto/
64
See generally, MILENA STERIO AND MICHAEL SCHARF, THE LEGACY OF AD
HOC INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2019).
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Sudan and Libya to the ICC for prosecution.65 But in Syria, the
Security Council could do absolutely nothing. This led the United
States Representative to bluntly declare: “The United States is
disgusted that a couple of members of this Council continue to
prevent us from fulfilling our sole purpose here, which is to address
an ever-deepening crisis in Syria and a growing threat to regional
peace and security. For months, this Council has been held hostage
by a couple of members.”66
Enter Liechtenstein’s U.N. Ambassador Christian
Wenaweser, who had formerly served as President of the
International Criminal Court’s Assembly of State Parties. In the fall
of 2016, Ambassador Wenaweser hatched a bold plan for an endrun around the Security Council that did not involve invoking the
disfavored Uniting for Peace Resolution. For months, Wenaweser
canvassed U.N. Delegates, arguing: “We have postponed any
meaningful action on accountability too often and for too long.”67
Commenting on the outsized role Wenaweser played, Harvard Law
Professor Alex Whiting writes, “the short history of international
criminal justice, from Nuremberg to the present, is full of heroic
individuals and their improbable and creative ideas that have pushed
the project forward.”68
Galvanized by Ambassador Wenaweser’s efforts, on
December 21, 2016, the United Nations General Assembly took a
historic step in establishing a mechanism to investigate and preserve
evidence of international crimes in Syria, the first time the Assembly

65

Security Council Press Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur,
Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, March 31, 2005,
https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm; Situation in Libya, ICC01/11, available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya.
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U.N. SCOR., 67th Sess., 6711th mtg., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6711 (Feb. 4, 2014).
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REUTERS, December 21, 2016, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/usmideast-crisis-syria-warcrimes-idUSKBN14A2H7?il=0
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has established such a body.69 Despite objection by Russia, the
General Assembly adopted Resolution 71/248 by a vote of 105 to
15 with 52 abstentions, creating the International, Impartial and
Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and
Prosecution of Those Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes
under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic
since March 2011, known in shorthand as the IIIM.70
The IIIM is empowered to collect evidence from other
bodies including the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry established by the Human Rights Council, and to conduct its
own investigations “including interviews, witness testimony,
documentation and forensic material.”71 The General Assembly
resolution directs the IIIM to analyze the collected evidence and
prepare files of evidence that could be provided to “national,
regional or international courts or tribunals that have or may in the
future have jurisdiction over these crimes, in accordance with
international law.”72
This was the first time in history that the General Assembly
established an investigative body to assemble and analyze evidence
of international crimes for the purpose of preserving evidence for
future international or domestic trials. Its authority to do so was
questioned by Russia. During the debate on the resolution and
subsequently in a note-verbale dated February 8, 2017, the Russian
Government complained that “the General Assembly acted ultra
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vires — going beyond its powers as specified” in the UN Charter.73
Specifically, Russia argued that
a number of powers vested in the mechanism under
[R]esolution 71/248, including those of “analys[ing]
evidence” and “prepar[ing] files,” are prosecutorial
in nature. However, prosecutions, criminal
investigations and support of criminal investigations
are not among the functions of the General
Assembly. It cannot create an organ that has more
powers than the General Assembly itself.74
There was a time when it was not settled whether the
Security Council, itself, had the power to establish a prosecutorial
institution, let alone whether the General Assembly could do so. But
that question was answered in the affirmative by the Appeals
Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal in 1995 based on the
extraordinary powers vested in the Security Council under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter to maintain international peace and security.75
The General Assembly has much more limited powers, and they do
not include the power to prosecute international crimes. Yet, it is not
clear that the powers of the IIIM are “prosecutorial in nature” in the
sense that they entail the prosecution of individuals, a power that
could only be conferred by the Security Council. Rather, the
resolution and Secretary General’s report describe a “prosecutorial”
body only in respect to the standards that will be adopted by the
IIIM when collecting and analyzing evidence. If one views the IIIM
73

The Secretary-General, Note verbale dated 8 February 2017 from the
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary General, UN Doc. A/71/793, 14 February 2017.
74
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75
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Defense Motion: Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 10 August 1995), affirmed,
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (Appeals Chamber, Decision on
the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995);
VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, Vol. 1 at 95-97 (1998).
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not as a sort of investigative judge or prosecutor but simply as a factfinding body that will adhere to a criminal law standard in
performing its functions, its creation would seem to be squarely
within the powers of the General Assembly. In this respect the IIIM
is not much different than the several commissions established by
the General Assembly-created Human Rights Council to investigate
international criminal law violations in Palestine (2006), Lebanon
(2006), Darfur (2006), Libya (2011), Cote d’Ivoire (2011), Syria
(2012), Eritrea (2014), DPRK (2014), and Ethiopia (2021).76
Article 10 of the UN Charter gives the General Assembly the
power to “discuss” and make “recommendations” concerning “any
questions or matters within the scope of the present Charter or
relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in
the present Charter.”77 As such, it is within the mandate of the
General Assembly to consider questions of threats to peace and
security in Syria and whether a referral to the ICC or the
establishment of an ad hoc tribunal is warranted. Further, Article 22
of the Charter empowers the General Assembly to “establish such
subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its
functions.”78 Therefore, the General Assembly has the authority to
establish a “subsidiary organ” to collect and assess the available
evidence of international crimes in Syria in order to inform the
General Assembly’s discussion and recommendations on these
matters. On the other hand, the evidence collected by the IIIM would
undeniably not be used solely (or even primarily) for the purpose of
the General Assembly’s discussion and recommendations, but it is
not clear that additional uses of the information would render the
creation of the IIIM beyond the power of the General Assembly.
Whatever the merits of Russia’s legal argument, the
establishment of this novel institution by the General Assembly
76
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clearly evinces a fundamental power shift away from the Security
Council and to the General Assembly caused by the international
community’s frustration with the abuse of the veto to prevent action
to deal with international atrocities. In providing a legal justification
for this power shift, Professor Jennifer Trahan of New York
University argues
[t]he veto power is being abused in a way never
anticipated when the Charter was drafted, and in a
way that is at odds with other bodies of international
law (such as the highest level jus cogens norms) and
the “purposes and principles” of the UN Charter,
with which the Security Council (including its
permanent members) are bound, under article 24.2 of
the Charter, to act in accordance.79
79

Jennifer Trahan, Russia’s Illegitimate Veto, Opinio Juris (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://opiniojuris.org/2018/04/23/the-narrow-case-for-the-legality-of-strikes-insyria-and-russias-illegitimate-veto/. Trahan argues that there are three ways in
which the Russian veto of the proposal to refer the matter of Syria to the
International Criminal Court, or to at least establish an international
investigative mechanism for Syria was incompatible with the UN Charter. First,
the veto power derives from the UN Charter, which is subsidiary to jus cogens
norms. Thus, a veto that violates jus cogens norms, or permits the continued
violation of jus cogens norms, would be illegal. The Charter (and veto power)
must be read in a way that is consistent with jus cogens. Second, the veto power
derives from the UN Charter, which states in Article 24(2) that the Security
Council “[in] discharging [its] duties …shall act in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” A veto in the face of a credible
draft resolution aimed at curtailing or alleviating the commission of genocide,
crimes against humanity or war crimes does not accord with the Charter’s
purposes and principles. And finally, a permanent member of the Security
Council that utilizes the veto power also has other treaty obligations, such as
those under the Genocide Convention, which contains an obligation to “prevent”
genocide. A Permanent Member’s use of the veto that would enable genocide, or
allow its continued commission, would violate that state’s legal obligation to
“prevent” genocide. A similar argument can be made as to allowing the
perpetration of at least certain war crimes, such as “grave breaches” and
violations of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
For a contrary view, see Mohamed Helal, On the Legality of the Russian Vetoes
and the Harsh Realities of International Law, A Rejoinder to Professor Jennifer
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To some, this extraordinary action by the General Assembly
confirmed Larry Johnson’s view that the Uniting for Peace
Resolution was no longer necessary. The power of the
General Assembly was ascending without it.
B. Humanitarian Intervention: The Bombing of the Syrian
Chemical Weapons Facilities
In its 2001 report on “Responsibility to Protect,” the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
opined that the General Assembly could play an important role in
legitimizing force to halt atrocities where the Security Council is
prevented from doing so by the veto.80 But fearing a slippery slope
in which the Responsibility to Protect principle would be used in
conjunction with the Uniting for Peace Resolution to target certain
States (such as Israel), the “responsibility to protect” concept as
adopted by the Assembly in the 2005 World Summit Outcome
resolution does not contemplate the Assembly recommending that
States use coercive force to stop a State from committing atrocity
crimes against it own population.81
This explains why the General Assembly did not invoke the
Uniting for Peace Resolution in the context of Syrian use of
chemical weapons against the Syrian population in 2013-2018. With
the Security Council paralyzed and the General Assembly not
perceived as a viable option, on April 14, 2018, the United States,
United Kingdom, and France acted on their own in conducting

Trahan, Opinio Juris, May 4, 2018, available at:
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airstrikes against three Syrian chemical weapons facilities.82 They
justified their use of force as necessary to prevent the Assad regime
from continuing to use chemical weapons against the Syrian
population in the context of Security Council paralysis to establish
accountability for this international crime. Before the Syrian
airstrikes, most countries and experts had taken the position that
there was no international law right of humanitarian intervention
under customary international law or the UN Charter except when
authorized by the UN Security Council.83
This was confirmed in 1999, when Russia blocked the
Security Council from authorizing force against Serbia to safeguard
Kosovar Albanians in the Serb province of Kosovo from ethnic
cleansing, and NATO launched a 78-day bombing campaign against
Serbia without Security Council authorization. The United States
and United Kingdom justified the action as a sui generous act to
save hundreds of thousands of lives.84 The UN described it as
“unlawful but legitimate.”85 In the years since the 1999 NATO
airstrikes, countries have used force for humanitarian purposes
without Security Council authorization on several other occasions,
including the U.S.-U.K. imposition of a no-fly zone over Iraq to
protect the Marsh Arabs from Saddam Hussein’s reprisals,86 the
Russian invasion of South Ossetia, Georgia ostensibly to protect
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ethnic Russians living there from attack,87 and the U.S. airstrikes
against the ISIS terrorist group to save the besieged Yazidis on
Mount Sinjar, Iraq.88 But never before the April 14, 2018 airstrikes
against Syria had humanitarian use of force been accompanied by a
clear legal justification based on a right of humanitarian
intervention.
In contrast to the prior cases, the countries participating in
the April 2018 airstrikes on Syria embraced a common legal
justification – humanitarian intervention – rather than cite only
factual considerations that render use of force morally defensible as
they had in the past. The United Kingdom was the most explicit of
the three, telling the Security Council that its actions were legally
justified on the basis of “humanitarian intervention” in the context
of preventing use of chemical weapons when the Security Council
had been paralyzed by a Permanent Member’s veto.89 It stated that
“[a]ny State is permitted under international law, on an exceptional
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basis, to take measures in order to alleviate overwhelming
humanitarian suffering.”90
The United Kingdom’s position was that humanitarian
intervention in such cases without Security Council authorization
would not be in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter because
that provision only prohibits the use of force that is “against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state” and
“inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”91
Humanitarian intervention, the United Kingdom argued, is
consistent with the Charter’s Purposes and Principles, which include
“maintaining international peace and security,” “promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights,” and “sav[ing] succeeding
generations from the scourge of war.” According to the United
Kingdom, humanitarian intervention in response to use of chemical
weapons is not seeking to threaten the integrity of a state or bring
about political change, but only to save lives and enforce the global
ban on chemical weapons.92 The United Kingdom’s argument
would have been strengthened if the General Assembly had
authorized the action under the Uniting for Peace Resolution,
thereby rendering it a collective action taken by the U.N. rather than
by just three States.93
For its part, the United States told the Security Council that
“[t]he United States is deeply grateful to the United Kingdom and
90
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France for their part in the coalition to defend the prohibition of
chemical weapons. We worked in lock step: we were in complete
agreement” (emphasis added).94 As such, the United States can be
held to have implicitly adopted the rationale of the United
Kingdom.95 This is particularly significant because the United States
has never before recognized a right of humanitarian intervention
outside of Security Council authorization under international law.
Out of a total of seventy states that publicly commented on
the airstrikes at the United Nations or elsewhere, only a small
handful of countries questioned their legality.96 This suggests that
the United Kingdom, France and the United States could have easily
garnered the votes of two-thirds the General Assembly to obtain
authorization under the Uniting for Peace Resolution if they had
decided to go that route. Such action would have avoided the
possibility of mixed motives and self-interests. As one author has
observed, “the most effective safeguard that the developing world
has against unilateral misuse of force by those with the military
capabilities is by an unbiased U.N. authorization of collective
force.”97
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The implications of the April 2018 airstrikes are farreaching. Like the creation of the IIIM, the growing recognition of
a right of humanitarian intervention without Security Council
authorization represents a fundamental power shift from the
Security Council – which had historically been viewed as holding
the keys to use of force – to coalitions of states who assert a right to
act to save lives when the Council is paralyzed.
C. Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: Reemergence of the
Uniting for Peace Resolution
While the United States had been wary of resorting to the
Uniting for Peace Resolution for the past fifty years,98 in response
to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 the United States
decided the time was right to dust off the Resolution and once again
put it to use. On February 27, 2022, eleven members of the Security
Council voted in favor of the U.S.-sponsored resolution calling for
an emergency session of the General Assembly under the Uniting
for Peace process; only Russia opposed, while three members
abstained (China, India and the United Arab Emirates).99 Twentyfour hours later, in an emergency session broadcast live around the
world, an overwhelming number of States joined together to express
their collective disapprobation of the Russian aggression.
Ukraine’s representative, who introduced the resolution,
said that “for almost a week, his country has been fighting missiles
and bombs. Half a million people have fled as the Russian
Federation tries to deprive his country of the right to exist, carrying
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out a long list of war crimes.”100 The U.S. representative urged
countries to vote in favor of the Resolution, saying her country “is
choosing to stand with the Ukrainian people and will hold the
Russian Federation accountable for its actions.” 101 The
representative of the European Union, speaking for the 28 EU
States, added: “This is not just about Ukraine, this is not just about
Europe, this is about defending an international order based on rules.
… Today's historic vote clearly shows the Russian Federation’s
isolation from the rest of the international community.” 102
The Special Session resulted in the adoption of Resolution
ES-11/1 by a large majority --141 in favor, 5 against and 35
abstentions.103 The Resolution did not go as far as some of the prior
Uniting for Peace Resolutions. It did not call for sanctions,
peacekeepers, or collective use of force. But it did return to a legal
characterization that the General Assembly had long avoided by
declaring the Russian invasion to constitute an act of “aggression”104
– recognized as a crime under international law.105 Specifically, the
Resolution deplored “in the strongest terms the “aggression by the
Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of Article 2 (4) of
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Charter” and condemned Russia’s declaration as to the necessity of
this “special military operation.”106
Resolution ES-11/1 further demanded Russia to “cease its
use of force against Ukraine” as well as to “immediately, completely
and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the
territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized
borders.”107 It also condemned “all violations of international
humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights,”
demanding that parties to the conflict “fully comply with their
obligations under international humanitarian law to spare the
civilian population.”108
The finding that Russia committed aggression in Ukraine has
already had an effect in the Ukraine v. Russia case, where the
International Court of Justice drew upon Resolution ES-11/1 to
support the ordering of provisional measures to protect the rights of
Ukraine from being subject to the use of force by Russia based upon
false allegations of genocide under the Genocide Convention.109
And it could be of legal relevance in criminal cases in either
domestic courts or an ad hoc tribunal prosecuting Russian leaders
for the crime of aggression.110
Resolution ES-11/1 is unlikely to be the General Assembly’s
final word on the Ukraine situation. Rather, it is anticipated that the
resolution will be a door opener to a variety of possible collective
106
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actions by the General Assembly as the crisis unfolds in the months
and years ahead. For example, the General Assembly’s finding in
Resolution ES-11/1 that the “rights and benefits” of membership111
entail good faith obligations could provide a foundation for future
claims that the Russian government has not acted in accordance with
the expectations incumbent on a U.N. member state. While the
General Assembly cannot unilaterally suspend Russia from the U.N.
through Article 5 of the UN Charter,112 it could potentially use that
finding to reject Russia’s credentials and block Russian diplomats
from participating in U.N. bodies. Usually, credentials challenges
involve competing government claims to represent the State, but
there is precedent for the General Assembly to factor in a regime’s
adherence to the U.N. Charter in assessing whether to accept or
reject credentials. The credentials of the South African apartheid
regime were thus rejected for many years by the General Assembly
due to its “flagrant violation” of the U.N. Charter.113
Another way in which the General Assembly’s
determinations might assist the international community’s response
to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is in supporting the legal
justification and coalescing political will for the continuation and
strengthening of sanctions against Russia. In response to Russia’s
war of aggression against Ukraine, the United States, European
Union, and several other States have imposed the most
comprehensive economic sanctions ever leveled on a major world
power.114 Individual sanctions (including freezing of assets and
restrictions on travel) have now been imposed on more than a
111
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thousand Russian decision-makers in key political and economic
positions. Almost 50 percent of the Russian central bank’s foreign
exchange reserves have been frozen, and Western banks have been
prohibited from undertaking transactions with it, making it
extremely difficult for Russia to service debt. Other Russian banks
have been removed from the SWIFT system, making international
transactions more difficult for Russian companies. Russian airlines
have been banned from European and US airspace; their aircraft are
no longer being maintained and they cannot obtain parts. In addition,
Russian energy and arms companies can no longer receive loans
from Western banks. Key technologies for aviation, shipping, and
raw material extraction and processing are subject to an export
ban.115 While Russia has the monetary reserves and revenue from
continuing oil and gas exports to fund its military operations, “it may
not be able to arm it as easily if sanctions continue.”116 Restrictions
on imports of aviation parts and high-tech goods mean that Russia
will “have very limited ability to make tanks, missiles...and fighter
jets."117
Russia is the world’s second-largest exporter of crude oil,
accounting for most of its foreign trade. 118 Significantly, the United
States and EU States have agreed to ban imports of Russian coal,
gas, and petroleum, but with transitional periods for countries that
115
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are particularly affected and exemptions for pipeline deliveries.119
Despite these sanctions, Russia exported $97.7 billion worth of
fossil fuels in the first 100 days since its invasion of Ukraine, at an
average of $977 million per day. 120 Most of the Russian oil, gas,
and coal went to China, India, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and
Egypt, which have not imposed bans on Russian oil.121 Through
these exports, Russia is keeping its economy afloat. This
demonstrates an axiom of trade sanctions – they don’t work well
unless they are applied universally, as they were against Iran in the
early 2000s.122
The General Assembly has used the Uniting for Peace
Resolution in the past to call upon members to impose diplomatic
sanctions and trade embargoes as a countermeasure to induce
compliance with international law by a law-breaking State.123 For
States questioning the legitimacy of such sanctions, the General
Assembly could play a useful role certifying that the conditions for
119
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the valid invocation of the law of countermeasures under Article 49
of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State
Responsibility (proportionality, proper purpose, and temporal
limitation) have been met.124
Finally, in collaboration with Ukraine, acting under the
Uniting for Peace Resolution, the General Assembly could establish
a “hybrid tribunal” to prosecute the Crime of Aggression. Such a
court has been proposed by a number of experts and
organizations.125 The International Criminal Court can prosecute
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed by
Russian nationals in Ukraine because the Ukraine government
lodged a declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over such
crimes since 2013.126 But a separate international tribunal is needed
because the International Criminal Court does not have jurisdiction
over Russian aggression under the terms of the 2010 Kampala
Aggression Amendment to the ICC Statute.127 Moreover, although
124
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Since Russia is not a party to the ICC Statute and has not accepted the
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Ukraine has a criminal statute granting Ukraine courts jurisdiction
over the Crime of Aggression,128 Ukraine would not be able to
prosecute the top Russian leaders because of the doctrine of Head of
State Immunity, which does not apply to international courts.129
As discussed above, the General Assembly’s powers are
limited to making recommendations, as confirmed by the
International Court of Justice in the Certain Expenses case and the
General Assembly lacks the ability to take enforcement action,
which is the exclusive prerogative of the Security Council.130 As
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s
Appeals Chamber made clear in the Tadić case, the establishment
of a criminal tribunal is a form of such coercive or enforcement
action.131 But the General Assembly’s past practice has indicated a
way around those limitations. The General Assembly can support
an exercise of criminal jurisdiction possessed by one or more UN
Member States. The foremost example is the GA’s creation of the
Aggression Amendment, Russian nationals cannot be prosecuted by the ICC for
the Crime of Aggression unless the Security Council referred the case.
128
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Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). In the
case of the ECCC, the General Assembly introduced a resolution
recommending the UN Secretary General to enter into a bilateral
agreement with the Government of Cambodia for establishing a
criminal tribunal,132 and subsequently, the resolution establishing
the ECCC was approved by the General Assembly.133
IV. Conclusion
The Security Council and General Assembly’s resort to the
Uniting for Peace mechanism for the first time since 1982 reflects
the failure of the Security Council to fulfill its responsibility to
respond to threats to international peace and security. With the
Security Council paralyzed once again by the veto during a new
Cold War, institutional power has shifted to the General Assembly.
The United States conceived the Uniting for Peace
mechanism during the Korean War to end-run the Soviet veto and
supported its use for several decades thereafter. But after the
Uniting for Peace mechanism began to be used as a way to sanction
Israel notwithstanding U.S. vetoes at the Security Council, the
United States concluded that the mechanism should be relegated to
the dustpan of history, where it remained unused for 30 years. The
dawn of a new Cold War, sparked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,
changed the calculous. In resorting to the Uniting for Peace
mechanism in 2022, the United States had little to lose because the
General Assembly through diplomatic practice and International
Court of Justice decisions, had slowly amassed the power to act on
matters of which the Security Council was seized, to recommend
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imposition of sanctions, and to create investigative bodies and
hybrid tribunals without invoking the Uniting for Peace resolution.
The foundation of the Uniting for Peace Resolution imbued
Resolution ES-11/1 with tremendous symbolic value, and the
Resolution’s determination that Russia had committed an
unprovoked act of aggression had an immediate impact on the
Russia-Ukraine International Court of Justice case and has set the
stage for subsequent actions by the General Assembly. These might
include a credentials challenge to suspend the Russian delegation
from participation at the United Nations, endorsement of diplomatic
and economic sanctions, and the creation of a hybrid tribunal to
prosecute Russian leaders for the crime of aggression.
This article’s discussion of possible steps the General
Assembly can take under the Uniting for Peace Resolution to
continue to engage in the Ukraine crisis in the face of Security
Council paralysis would not be complete without recognizing the
significant political challenges that stand in the way of taking such
action. In the context of the Ukraine crisis, the diplomatic winds can
change quickly reflecting the evolving situation on the ground. But
as Professor Michael Ramsden has observed, as States seek
“creative solutions to overcome misuses of the Security Council
veto, it is the General Assembly, now as in 1950, that can step into
the breach.”134
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